Dualistic sector choice and female labour supply: evidence from formal and informal sector in Cameroon by Gauthier Lanot & Christophe Muller
Dualistic Sector Choice and Female Labour
Supply: Evidence from Formal and Informal
Sectors in Cameroon





Centre for the Study of African Economies




Oxford  OX1 3UL
Gauthier Lanot is at Keele University, UK. Christophe Muller is at CSAE, University of Oxford; his e-mail address is
christophe.muller@economics.ox.ac.uk.
This research has been funded by the Programme d’Analyses et de Recherches Economiques Appliquées au
Développement International (PARADI) at the Université Laval (for the academic years 1993–94 for the first author,
and 1993-94 and 1994-95 for the second author). The second author acknowledges also a TMR grant from the European
Union which has allowed the completion of this project. We would like to thank participants in seminars at Journées
PARADI and Université Laval in Canada; at CREST and DIAL in Paris; and at the Universities of Oxford, Keele and
Dundee in the UK; and particularly I. Walker, D. Margolis, B. Fortin, T. Lemieux, F. Teal and S. Bond. We are grateful
to DIAL–DSCN which made the data available to us.
Abstract: In developing countries, labour supply and activity choices are distorted by the existence of labour market
imperfections restricting entry to the activity sectors or rationing the worked hours. The presence of decreasing returns
to labour in the informal sector is another specific characteristic of labour market dualism in LDCs. Because of the
existence of entry costs, hours rationing in the formal sector and the non-linear earnings function in the informal sector
that is quasi-autarkic in labour, the usual separation theorems of the standard labour supply models do not apply. Using
data from a sample of women in Yaoundé (Cameroon) in 1993, choosing their activity in different sectors, we show that
formal and informal labour markets have features associated with dualism and market imperfections. By contrast with
the simplified models in the literature, we estimate a non-linear non-separable integrated model of activity choice and
labour supply of female workers, jointly with market imperfections. We identify the effects of explanatory variables of
the preferences and the earnings functions in this simultaneous structural framework. The results show that the earnings
function in the informal sector is strictly concave in hours, and positively related to the education and experience of
workers and the capital of the family firm. The presence of young children has a negative impact on the latent labour
supply whereas that of other female members makes easier the supply of labour which is consistent with the existence
of substitutabilities in the domestic chores. Other children, age and marital status of the worker also influence the latent
labour supply.Résumé
Dans les pays en développement, l’offre de travail et les choix d’activité sont perturbés par la présence d’imperfections
de marchés restreignant l’entrée dans les secteurs d’activité ou rationnant les heures travaillées. L’existence de
rendements décroissants du travail dans le secteur informel est un autre trait spécifique du dualisme du marché du travail
dans les PVD. En raison de l’existence de coûts d’entrée, de rationnement des heures dans le secteur formel et de
fonctions de gain nonlinéaires dans le secteur informel quasi-autarcique en travail, les théorèmes usuels de séparation
des modèles standards d’offre de travail ne s’appliquent pas.
A partir d’informations pour un échantillon de femmes à Yaoundé (Cameroun) en 1993, choisissant leur activité dans
différents secteurs, nous montrons que les marchés du travail formels et informels ont des caractéristiques associées avec
dualisme et imperfections de marché. A la différence des modèles simplifiés dans la littérature, nous estimons un modèle
nonlinéaire nonséparable intégré de choix d’activité et d’offre de travail des travailleurs féminins, de façon jointe à des
imperfections de marché. Nous identifions les effets des variables explicatives des préférences et des fonctions de gain
dans ce cadre structurel simultané. Les résultats montrent que la fonction de gain dans le secteur informel est strictement
concave par rapport aux heures, et positivement reliée à l’éducation et l’expérience du travailleur, et au capital de
l’entreprise familiale. La présence de jeunes enfants a un impact négatif sur l’offre de travail latente, alors que celle
d’autres membres féminins facilite l’offre de travail, ce qui est cohérent avec l’existence de substitutabilités dans les
taches ménagères. Les autres enfants, l’age et le statut matrimonial influencent également l’offre de travail latente.Contents
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Annexe 1 31Or even, as in the organisational dualism theory, with real wage related to traditional or subsistence
1
consumption standard, rather than based on the marginal productivity calculus.
However, we do not pretend to provide a realistic representation of the labour market in Cameroon. Neither
2
shall we attempt to test the possible labour market segmentation, since the passage from one sector to another is
considered as resulting in part from utility maximisation, accounting for various constraints which limit the mobility of
workers, but do not make it impossible.
1
1. Introduction
Labour markets in developing countries are often characterised by dualism (Lewis (1954), Ranis
and Fei (1961), Myint (1985)) rather than perfect competition. The existence of activities with
diminishing return to labour in the traditional sector  and entry costs in the modern sector are a
1
specific feature of this dualism, especially when agricultural production or the informal sector is
involved (Ghatak and Ingersent (1984)). Often, the fundamental opposition is between a
commercialised versus a non-commercialised context. The existence of a large gap between real
wages in both sectors induces traditional workers to migrate into the modern sector. When
modelling the labour supply or the activity of workers, the decreasing return to labour in the
traditional sector naturally suggests agricultural household models (Sen (1966), Singh, Squire and
Strauss (1986), Gronau (1986)), in which the rewards resulting from different technologies or
markets can be compared. Several attempts at estimating such models have been carried out in
the context of labour markets (Benjamin (1992), Jacoby (1993), Lemieux, Fortin and Fréchette
(1994), Newman and Gertler (1994)).
The aim of this article is to extend the study of activity choice and labour supply models based on
comparison of wage rates, to more general cases involving fixed costs, hours rationing and non-
linear earning functions, for which the Roy model (Roy (1951)) and the separation of decisions
are then no longer valid. Our general framework is particularly relevant for the study of dualistic
labour markets in LDCs, and notably for the urban markets composed of formal and informal
sectors. The emphasis of this paper is to propose a further step in the neoclassical modelling of
non-separable labour behaviour under market imperfections.
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We present the structure of the dualistic activity choice and labour supply models in Section 2.
We describe the sample of female workers in Yaoundé, capital of Cameroon, in 1993, and their
activity sectors in Section 3, and we show the estimation results of participation choices.  The
labour market in Yaoundé displays dualistic features typical of developing countries, due to the
importance of the informal sector. We describe the integrated non-separable model in Section 4.
We derive in section 5 the likelihood of the structural model, discuss the explanatory variables and
present the estimation results. We conclude in Section 6.
2. The structure of the dualistic activity choice models
2.1 The dualistic context
Labour markets in developing countries are generally characterised by dualism and market
imperfections rather than perfect competition. On the one side, Ricardo (1815) first, then later
Lewis (1954) and Ranis and Fei (1961) described the labour market in developing countries in a
dualistic framework where a traditional sector with a low and variable return to labour and a low
level of capital stock coexists with a modern sector with high wages and substantial accumulation2
of capital. See Ranis (1988) for a survey of dualism in development theories. Saint-Paul (1996)
extends this representation to industrial countries. On the other side, Rosenzweig (1988) notes
that the main deficiency of the studies of dualism is the lack of interpretation of results in terms
of behaviour. The same issues apply to the urban labour market of most developing countries, in
which the informal sector plays the role of the traditional sector. This calls for the explicit
modelling of sector choice and labour supply behaviour in a dualistic environment.
In this context, the urban workers choose their labour activity among varied types of work and
earnings perspectives. The recent empirical literature distinguishes three different sectors: formal
sector (or primary sector), informal sector (or secondary sector), and non-participation (see
Dickens and Lang (1985, 1992); Hill (1988); Chiswick (1988); Magnac (1991); Lemieux, Fortin
and Fréchette (1994); Tiefenthaler (1994); Hill (1994); Pradhan (1994)). By definition in the
segmented market literature, the primary sector is characterised by high wages, high returns to
education and to on-the-job training, and a very concentrated weekly hours schedule. Entry into
the primary sector is rationed. Conversely, in the secondary sector, wages are generally low and
earnings may be a non-linear function of the worked hours (originated from a technology with
decreasing returns to labour). The rates of return to education or experience are low or non-
existent in the secondary sector. The weekly hours are much more variable than in the primary
sector. Even without specifying a model of market segmentation, this type of dichotomy between
sectors seems to be empirically relevant, probably resulting from subjacent market imperfections.
The main features of this dichotomy, such as the wage gap, are also consistent with the
description of dualist labour markets (see Saint-Paul (1996)).
The representation of economic links between the different sectorial labour markets is far from
obvious. Is it relevant to consider a single labour market as in the traditional neoclassical models
(Killingsworth (1983)), or should specific market mechanisms be specified for each sector? In the
latter case what are the characteristics of each market and of the earnings function associated with
each type of job? The labour market segmentation theory (Reich, Gordon and Edwards (1973);
Piore (1983); Mazumdar (1983)) rejects the hypothesis of perfect competition in labour markets
in favour of a dualistic representation of labour markets. By contrast, we use the framework of
neoclassical labour markets, although incorporating entry costs and hours rationing in the primary
sector, and accounting for the quasi-autarky of labour in the informal sector. Thus, if
segmentation or efficiency wages are present (see Saint-Paul (1996) for a survey of this
literature), they are reduced here to the observation of wages in the formal sector that may be
different from their marginal productivity, and to rationing and entry costs.
In our model, we describe the rationing of the job supply in the primary sector by entry costs.
Another element of the restriction of choices in our model is the hours rationing in the primary
sector where the set of wage-hours contracts offered is much more limited than in the secondary
sector. To simplify the model we assume that there are entry costs only in the primary sector,
which does not mean that every worker in the secondary sector is necessarily rationed since she
may have chosen the secondary sector even without the entry costs because her productivity is
higher in this sector. One could also imagine that there are different types of entry costs in the
primary sector for workers coming from unemployment and from the secondary sector. We do
not treat the rationing process in such detail and we consider in fact that the job rationingIn the literature, the entry costs in a specific sector are generally specified as a linear function of worker
3
characteristics. For example, Magnac assumes that the costs of entry depend only on the variables appearing in the wage
equation, arguing that these costs are determined by the demand side. In Dickens and Lang (1985), variable entry costs
are also explained by the variables of the wage equations, among which is the ethnic group and a dummy variable for
never-married people. Using data collected in the Philippines, Tiefenthaler (1994) finds that the entry costs are very
different between the sectors, partly because of the substantial transport cost in the primary sector. Using data from
Bolivia, Pradhan (1994) finds that education, ethnicity and location in an area with a high employment rate have a
significant positive effect on the probability of rationing.
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corresponding to unemployed workers is exogenous so as to focus on the links between primary
and secondary labour markets.
3
Activity choice has been treated in the literature with models based on log-linear wages or log-
linear shadow wages functions and where the endogeneity problems have been simplified by
recursivity assumptions or by two-steps estimation methods as in Jacoby (1993). First of all, the
Roy model (Roy (1951)) describes the sector choices as derived from the comparison of wage
equations in each sector. Todaro (1971) extends this framework by incorporating the probability
of obtaining a job in the formal sector, which is different to one due to entry restrictions. Chiswick
(1988) believes that even when there exists an informal sector, the human capital earning function
may still be a useful analytical tool. Finally, Magnac (1991) and Pradhan (1994) compare the
different sector wage equations (or implicit wage equations) with a precise treatment of the
selectivity problems. 
Most applications measure the informal sector wage as the average hourly income. This is
incorrect if the earnings function is a non-linear function of the worked hours, for example derived
from a technology showing decreasing returns to labour, and if the informal sector is quasi-
autarkic in labour, in the sense that the tasks for the worker’s firm are carried out by the worker
himself (sometimes by other members of the family). When the earnings function in the labour-
autarkic informal sector is non-linear in hours, or when there are entry costs and hours rationing
in the formal sector, wages are no longer the only information needed to explain sector choices.
Particularly, in the informal sector, the marginal productivity of labour can be very different from
the market wage rates of workers of the same qualification, since these workers are generally not
accepted as perfect substitutes for family members, or for the worker under consideration, in the
informal firm. This is due to the existence of moral hazard and adverse selection phenomena,
which make the employment of unknown workers unattractive for the manager of the informal
firm. Moreover, sector allocation and labour supply decisions are no longer separable. The correct
specification is characterised by the comparison of indirect utility levels, specific to each sector.
Given the characteristics in each sector, one simplifying strategy (different from separability
assumptions) is to carry out the estimation in two steps to avoid a simultaneous non-linear
estimation, even though the selectivity problem may not be perfectly controlled. Thus, Jacoby
(1993) estimates a non-recursive agricultural household model where the time allocation of the
household is decided in response to shadow wages, which are derived from a preliminary
estimation of the agricultural technology. Finally, in a non-separable framework, Newman and
Gertler (1994) estimate under limited information, by neglecting the budget constraint and
specifying linear implicit log-returns. To our best knowledge, there has never been a full
information estimation of a non-separable model with several sectors.A comparison of public and private modern sectors would also have been interesting to assess the influence
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of connections rather than competences in obtaining public jobs, since the difference in human capital in these sectors
is smaller than between the formal and the informal sector. However, the sub-sample of private sector workers is too
small (6.5 per cent of the whole sample) to be treated separately here.
 Female members working simultaneously in two different jobs are rare in our sample (8 per cent of workers)
5
and we neglect this element of the activity choice.
4
In the informal sector, a labour earnings function which is concave in the worked hours is a
natural assumption. Lemieux, Fortin and Fréchette (1994) use this specification for the estimation
of a labour supply model in Canada, where activities in both the formal sector and the informal
sector are simultaneously possible. Even if the importance of accounting for the technology of the
firm in the informal sector is acknowledged, Rosenzweig (1988) argues that the broad diversity
of products in the informal sector makes the estimation of this technology difficult. Nonetheless,
he insists on the usefulness of estimating the family firm technology to allow for all inputs, and
not to estimate only an earnings function. The heterogeneity of technologies in the urban informal
sector necessitates very rich information to carry out the estimation. This explains why an earnings
function linear in hours is generally estimated without explicitly considering the family production
function (for example Hill (1994)). Newman and Gertler (1994) find that the marginal return to
farm work and the marginal rate of substitution depend on family interactions. However, in order
to limit the size of our problem we do not study these interactions. We estimate an earnings
function that is concave in hours for the secondary sector, simultaneously with the labour
decisions and activity choice of the female worker. This yields more efficient estimates and a more
accurate treatment of the sample selectivity than with the two steps method using the shadow
prices. 
Another difficult question is the definition of sectors. ILO (1972) discusses the definition of
formal and informal sector in Kenya, which raises many difficulties. Rosenzweig (1988) notes that
every earnings functions comparison is very sensitive to the number, the definition and the
separation level of the sectors. Using data from the Philippines, Tiefenthaler distinguishes four
sectors (formal, informal, piece-work, non-participation) and so does Magnac (formal, informal,
non-participation, unemployment) with data from Columbia. Most other authors limit themselves
to three sectors (primary, secondary, non-participation) or unemployment. Besides, Taubman and
Wachter (1986) consider that distinctions across sectors are determined as much by data
availability as by the theory. Finally, Mead and Morrisson (1996) show that the term ‘informal
sector’ has very different meanings following the analysts. We consider first a nomenclature of
five sectors for descriptive dichotomic participation models, then we use only the three usual
sectors for the structural model. Even if we distinguish unemployment and non-participation in
the probit models, we do not model endogenously the unemployment situation in the structural
model, because of the complexity of its likelihood. We account for unemployed workers in this
model provided that this rationing is not related with the determinants of activity choices.
4
As it is recognised that the female labour supply is more flexible than the male labour supply (see
Killingsworth (1983)), particularly concerning the choice of non-participation, we focus on the
choices of female active members in the household.  This higher variability will make easier the
5
identification of the likelihood of the model. Of course, a similar study for men would be possible.Dickens and Lang (1985) judge that these characteristics are generally inferior in the secondary sector.
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However, Pradhan (1994) finds that women are more ready to participate in the informal sector than in the formal one
for the same wage. In any case the difference in the wage rate between the sectors may reflect the compensation for the
difference of labour disutility.
Several questions of economic policy can be treated in the framework of dualistic labour markets in LDCs. The
7
type of model that we propose allows the investigation of these questions, while accounting for the whole set of
interactions between decisions and sectors, and for the labour market imperfections. Since the aim of this paper is not
to provide a realistic representation of the Cameroon labour market, nor policy recommendations, we do not simulate
or study any specific policy. We mention, however, several possible policy investigations, as a general motivation for
the study of this type of model. The assessment of the effects of the fixation of public wages is a natural usage of such
model.
Firstly, the fixation at a high level of wage rates in the public sector is a potential source of imperfection of the labour
market. Indeed, for obvious political reasons, the wage rate in the public sector rarely corresponds to the marginal
productivity of labour. Besides, by definition, the public activities are not directly related to the system of private markets
and therefore their allocations and prices do not correspond to the general equilibrium allocation of the economy. 
Secondly, many African governments have lowered the wage rates of public servants in response to budgetary crises
and structural adjustment plans. Manpower regulation through dismissals, fixation of worked hours and modification
of entry barriers in the public sector has also been implemented. These policies are likely to entail migrations of workers
from the public sector to the informal sector, unemployment or non-participation categories.
Finally, the LDCs’ governments and the development agencies are increasingly concerned by the development of the
informal sector both as an alternative source of the economic growth and as an employment sector preferable to
unemployment for workers rejected from the primary sector. Consequently, the development projects aiming at
improving the productivity and the labour absorption capacity of the informal sector are in expansion.
In practice, the size and the direction of the migrations of manpower implied by all these policies, as well as the
importance of misallocations of labour, are almost unknown and the use of models, not accounting for the specific
characteristics and imperfections of these markets, may provide misleading conclusions.
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From a more general point of view, the question under study is how to account for the
heterogeneity of jobs in the female labour supply models. Killingsworth and Heckman (1986)
underline that despite the interest of this question, very few studies try to introduce job
heterogeneity in female labour decisions. When the heterogeneity of jobs is taken into account,
other characteristics of jobs than wage, such as fringe benefits, working conditions and other non-
pecuniary characteristics, are also chosen.  Hours rationing and entry costs are potentially two
6
major non-pecuniary characteristics of jobs and are concentrated in the primary sector in our
structural model. Unfortunately, the observation of labour supply provides only partial
information about structural parameters of the labour supply schedule. However, the observation





Cameroon in 1993 is a lower-middle-income economy (770 US$ of GNP per capita) at the
intersection of Western and Central Africa, with a large access to the gulf of Guinea. With 12.5
million inhabitants and 475 thousand square kilometres, it is a medium-sized African country. At
the time of the survey, the economy is in recession with an average annual 7.3 per cent decrease
of per capita GNP from 1985, and every production sector is affected (agriculture, wood, oil and
industry). Oil production is in decline and the 1992–93 coffee and cacao crops have fallen because
of public funding problems met by peasants (-29 per cent for robusta coffee, -32 per cent for
arabica coffee, -12 per cent for cacao). This bad conjuncture entails a permanent pressure on the
employment in rural and urban areas. The government is not able to comply with its commitments,
particularly with the IMF, which suspends its funding and asks for dismissals in the public sector.
Moreover, the World Bank strongly supports the privatisation and restructuration of public firms,
which is also likely to entail manpower migrations out of the formal sector in Yaoundé, mostly
composed of public administrations or firms.
The data used in this study are taken from a survey aimed at studying the employment conditions
of the population of Yaoundé, capital of Cameroon (DIAL-DSCN (1993)). The survey has been
realised in collaboration by DIAL (Développement des Investigations sur Ajustement à Long
Terme, research centre in Paris) and the DSCN at the Ministry of the Republic of Cameroon.
11172 people in 1961 households have been surveyed from a sampling plan based on spatial
teledetection. The collection took place in January–February 1993. The devaluation of the Franc
CFA (FCFA) in January 1994 does not affect the information collected that corresponds to
preceding periods. The survey provides information concerning the labour market status and the
activity of every individual aged over 10. Among 7 865 individuals of more than 9 years old, 2
947 are occupied active members and 832 unemployed. We consider the population of married
women or single female heads of household aged between 18 and 55, leaving us with 1225
individuals.
Individuals in the primary sector (27 per cent of the population) are wage earners, employed in
the public sector, either in an administration (64 per cent) or in a state firm (12 per cent), or
employed in a private firm (24 per cent). The secondary sector workers (18 per cent of the
population) are those who claim to be working either as a small-firm employer (less than 10 per
cent of the secondary sector workers) or as an artisan. 
DIAL-DSCN (1993b) shows that the activity conditions in the informal sector are very
precarious, with less than 20 per cent of the informal production unit with premises specifically
devoted to the activity. More than three third of these production units are limited to one worker.
Only 4 per cent employ more than three workers. Only 10 per cent of workers in the informal
sector are wage earners, and among them only one-third receive a fixed wage, the other ones
often being paid with respect to the task carried out. Moreover, most of salaried workers in the
informal sector have parental links with the owner of the firm, while the remaining wage earners
have generally as well strong social and ethnic links with this owner. Finally, more than two-thirds
of these jobs have been obtained from connections. All these elements strongly suggest that the
labour market for wage earners in the informal sector is extremely reduced and characterised by
overwhelming imperfections. An acceptable approximation seems to consider that in most cases,Note that the characteristics of non-participant and unemployed workers are very similar. The unavoidable and
8
common inaccuracy in the definition of these classes of workers may lead to confusion between unemployed workers
who have a strong need of work, and workers who would be ready to work only a few hours or in very favourable
conditions, perhaps unrealistic in the Cameroon context. Several tries with different definitions of the categories of
unemployed and non-participant do not seem to change substantially the results, perhaps because of the homogeneity
of these two categories.




the informal activities are labour-autarkic activities for the informal workers. In the rare cases
when another worker, who is a wage earner, is present in the informal unit, his/her labour is likely
to be imperfectly substitutable with the labour of the considered female worker. Indeed, moral
hazard and adverse selection phenomena are pervasive in this context, where the owner of the
firm or the person directly responsible for the activity (here mostly the considered female worker)
has a much more intense interest in the productivity of the informal firm, than a supplementary
wage earner, difficult to supervise with accuracy.
Unemployed workers (41 per cent of the population) are individuals reporting to have been
searching for a job at least once during the four weeks before the interview, individuals claiming
that no jobs are available as a reason for not searching and individuals reporting to suffer from
under-employment because of bad economic conditions. 14 per cent of female workers decide not
to participate in the labour market.
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We summarise this situation by assuming in the model that salaried workers belong to the primary
sector, whereas the secondary sector is composed of self-employed workers. Because of the
importance of public administration in Yaoundé, most (76 per cent) of salaried workers are civil
servants. The majority of these individuals work around 40 hours a week. The wage rates are
determined by a global pay scale which is negotiated with the government. Primary sector jobs
in the private sector often share similar characteristics. In the secondary sector, the worker
determines freely her labour supply and the technology of the individual firm may exhibit
diminishing marginal return to labour.
Table 1 gives details of the socio-economic characteristics of the sample by sector of activity. The
values obtained for these statistics compare well with what is known of the labour market in
Yaoundé (see DIAL-DSCN (1993a, 1993b)) and guaranties an excellent quality of the data.
Column ‘secondary sector (a)’ refers to observations for which the precise income is known.
Column ‘secondary sector (b)’ refers to the observations in the secondary sector for which only
the range of income is given. The two sets of observations may correspond to very different jobs,
secondary sector (b) being associated with the less formal jobs where the earnings are more
volatile, and secondary sector (a) with more stable earnings, but in the informal sector. This
distinction is also interesting because workers in the secondary sector (a) may have earnings
related to a rigid rate (possibly intermediary between their marginal and their average productivity
because of the variability of this productivity with time), while workers in the secondary sector
(b) may have earnings following a more flexible schedule that may be closest to their actual
marginal productivity, and even may better reflect a non-linear (in hours) earning function
originated from diminishing returns to labour.  The figure provided for the income per month
9
corresponds to the mean between the bounds of the range chosen. Dependants are defined as individuals surveyed living with the household who are neither the head of
10
household nor his/her spouse nor the children of the head of household.
From a more general point of view, the link household composition with activity sector and labour supply may
11
be resulting in part from the endogeneity of household composition. In particular, members of the family that originate
from outside the household domestic unit may be supported and incorporated in the richer households. Unfortunately,
our data do not enable us to correct for these parasite phenomena, and we neglect them in our comments.
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Unemployed and non-participants are on average younger than employed women. The average
education level in the primary sector (11.9 years) is almost twice the one in the secondary sector
(6.48 years) and is higher than in the non-participant and the unemployed sector (8.54 years). 63
per cent of the population have attended at least a secondary education. The husband’s age is
much higher for non-working women (33 years), while the husband’s education level is lower for
women in the secondary sector (5.85 years). The worker’s experience is higher in the primary
sector than in the secondary one, and much higher than for non-participant and unemployed
people, which suggests some permanency of these latter statuses for many female workers. The
number of female members in the household from 13 to 18 years old is lower for non-working
women. This suggests the possibility of a substitutability in the domestic work of these members
and that of female worker. The number of children under four years old is higher among the non-
working women, which is consistent with the fact that women often refuse to work in order to
devote more time to child care. The number of dependants  can be quite large – the maximum
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is 24 – but generally one or two dependants are present in the households. The number of
dependants is higher when the female worker is in the primary sector, and lower when she does
not work. This could be the consequence of the general social level of the household, since
traditionally the rich households have to take in charge some of their family members initially extra
to the household.  The married women are less active which is consistent with the fact that they
11
can rely on their husband’s income.
Several elements militate in favour of the existence of entry costs or market imperfections, when
investigating the simple descriptive statistics for different sectors. Having been born in a city other
than Yaoundé seems to be a disadvantage for working in the secondary sector. A preceding job
in an administration appears to favour employment in the primary sector. The sector of the father,
or of the husband’s father, may influence the present sector of the female worker. Women coming
from a peasant family are more likely to be non-working or to be employed in the secondary
sector rather than in the primary sector. On the contrary, when her father had worked in the
services, the female worker has more chances to be employed in the primary sector. Moreover,
the ethnic group of the woman, and even more the ethnic group of her husband, play a role in the
determination of the activity sector. Bassa or Bakoko people are more likely to work firstly in the
primary sector, secondly in the secondary one. By contrast, Bamiléké people are more
concentrated in the secondary sector.
The level of household assets is higher in the first type of secondary sector (1188 FCFA) than in
the second type (796 FCFA), which is associated with less productive activities. Moreover, this
assets level is closer to the one observed in the primary sector (879 FCFA). Non-working women
correspond to a much lower level of assets (204 FCFA).This picture is not altered substantially if we account for the variation in terms of weeks per year since 86 per
12
cent of the workers in the primary sector and 70 per cent of the workers in the secondary sector work no less than 40
weeks per year (with a mode at 48 weeks, with 42 per cent of the observations in the primary sector and a mode at 52
weeks in the secondary sector with the same proportion of the observations).
Moreover, in the public sector, since the log-wage equation attempts to recover the pay scale of civil servants
13
that depends mainly upon qualification, age and experience, it should not be very sensitive to variations of the sample
of workers if the estimation is accurate enough. In that case a regression in levels describing the salary scale would have
been possible, but less direct to compare with the log-wage equation in the informal sector.
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The number of worked weeks per year is higher in the primary sector (45.23 weeks) than in the
secondary sector (41.37 weeks). On the other hand, the number of worked weekly hours is higher
in the secondary sector (42.25 hours) than in the primary one (38.94 hours). The variance of the
worked hours in the two sectors corresponds to what is recognised in the literature as the
relatively stronger rigidity of hours in the primary sector. In the primary sector, 81 per cent of the
population works from 30 to 48 hours a week, with a strong mode at about 40 hours where we
observe 65 per cent of the observations. This justifies considering the hours worked per week as
rationed (generally at about 40) in the primary sector. In the secondary sector, we find 38 per cent
of the population working from 30 to 48 hours a week and the mode is at 60 hours where we see
10 per cent of the observations.  
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DIAL-DSCN (1993a, 1993b) provides empirical elements leading us to consider that despite the
market imperfections, the workers have considerable autonomy in their choice of activity sector.
Indeed, 25 per cent of unemployed people who lost their job chose to quit voluntarily. Less than
20 per cent of informal independent workers chose the informal sector because they had not found
a salaried job in the modern sector. This suggests that entry and exit into and out of the activity
sector is often voluntary, even if there exist barriers to entry. Note also that two-thirds of the
informal workers have obtained their job through family or friends, and only one-quarter by
directly applying for a job. 
3.2 Wage and non-labour income equations
As mentioned earlier, labour income can be reported in two different ways in the questionnaire:
either the individual reports the exact amount earned per month (in 1000 Francs CFA) or indicates
among several predetermined ranges, where her income is situated. We estimate now wage
equations for the two sectors, with the purpose of progressing in the preliminary statistical
analysis of the data, and not to conduct a structural analysis of wage determination. This justifies
that we use simpler specifications or methods, than what could be possible. In the case of the
primary sector, we estimate a log-wage equation on the continuous observations using an
Instrumental Variables method to account for the possible endogeneity of experience. Mills ratios,
included to investigate the possible selectivity bias for participation in the considered sector, are
not significant and have been excluded.  Statistics of the predictions from the 2SLS estimates of
13
this wage equation are shown in Table 1. The same type of log-wage equation has been estimated
for the secondary sector with the average hourly income instead of the wage. Henderson (1983),
find that the wage equations are not significantly different for wage and self-employed workers
in Iran. Other authors such as Chiswick found different results for the two sectors. In fact, there
is a trade-off between the need to compare similar activities and the risk of introducing selection
bias by restricting the set of occupations. Our estimates contribute to this debate and confirm the
structural difference between rewards in the formal and the informal sector. Table 2 shows theThe number of observations differs here a lot from that in the descriptive statistics because we used only the
14
most precise indicators for wages and unearned incomes in the estimates, systematically eliminating the ‘zero’
observations for incomes and imprecise data for wages. Indeed, we believe that for this type of data measurement error
is a major problem and if not treated would lead to meaningless estimates. That is another reason for not treating
explicitly the endogenous selectivity of the sample in these equations since some attrition bias results already from the
calculus of indicators.
Furthermore, the limited accuracy of 2SLS estimates indicates clearly that our instrument set is insufficient for
15
a satisfactory prediction of experience and education.
The return of education in the informal sector appears to be much too high in the 2SLS estimates (27 per cent).
16
This is in fact an illusion due to the loss of accuracy caused by the instrumentation. Indeed, the coefficients of education
are not significant in the 2SLS estimations. 
The no-education and the secondary education categories have been excluded in the equation. 
17
 Some women are still observed with no unearned income. We assume that this is due to the non-observation
18
rather than to the non-existence of unearned income. Since the existence of a significant selection effect using a
conventional Heckman 2-step method is rejected, all the predictions are obtained using the ordinary least squares
estimates on complete observations only.
10
estimation results of the log-wage equations.  The results of the Hausman tests show that
14
experience and education can be considered as exogenous in every log-wage equations, which
suggests favouring OLS estimates.
15
Ignoring the selectivity problem, the coefficient of the variable ‘years of education’ in the log-
wage equation can be interpreted as the rate of return to investment in schooling (see Willis
(1986)). The OLS estimates show that it is higher in the primary sector (0.071) than in the
secondary sector (0.048) where it is not significantly different from zero.  The coefficient of the
16
dummy for primary education is never significant in any sector while this education level could
be believed to be well adapted to the standard types of task that are carried out in the informal
sector. The coefficient of the dummy for higher education is significatively positive for the two
sectors and higher in the secondary sector and permits controlling for very qualified jobs
concerning only a few workers.  Also, as suggested sometimes in the segmented labour market
17
theory, the positive effect of the working experience is only positive in the primary sector. 
Once experience is included, the age plays a notable positive role only in the secondary sector.
Note also that the wage is much better explained in the primary sector than in the secondary one.
The average predicted unearned income and the average predicted weekly wage rate of the female
worker are higher in the primary sector than in the secondary one. It is interesting to see that
whatever the activity sector in which the female is working, on average her predicted primary
sector wage rate is always higher than her predicted secondary sector wage rate which is
consistent with dualism. However, primary workers gain more (300 Franc CFA more on average)
by being in this sector than do the other categories (110 to 150 FCFA on average). This is
consistent with the theory of comparative advantages and suggests that a model for which
workers balance their costs and advantages in different sectors, associated with a selection by
firms of workers according to their productivity, may fit the data well.
Observed unearned income is the sum of the woman’s unearned income and the total income of
the husband and of the dependants (if any are present).  The result of the estimation of the
18The same instruments as for the unearned income equation have been used to derive predicted values for the
19
dummy variables specific to the preceding job of the female worker (among these variables is the dummy for
administration). Indeed, these variables may be related to the same type of choice as those under study. We use the
predicted variables in the estimation.
Note that this was not always obvious in Table 1, especially when the two types of secondary sector, or the two
20
types of non-working status, are compared.
The workers whose husbands are well educated participate less in the second type of informal sector, when
21
predicted wages are added to the equation.
11
unearned income equation is presented in Table 3. This is an auxiliary equation used to generate
the variable ‘predicted unearned income’. The number of children, their age, the age and the
education level of the husband, and the size of the husband’s father’s firm are shown to influence
the level of unearned income.
3.3 The participation model
In a first step towards the estimation of a full model of activity choices, we describe the
participation process, for each type of activity considered. This preliminary examination of the
data based on probit models enables us to include a large set of explanatory variables. The
population under study is composed of married women who are distributed in five sub-
populations: 1) formal sector; 2) informal sector with precise income (type a); 3) informal sector
with inaccurate income (type b); 4) non-participating women; 5) unemployed women. The
participation choices in 1, 2, 3 have been studied separately with respect to alternatives 4 and 5.
In this analysis, we ignore the selectivity problem involved in the simultaneous consideration of
all alternatives. That will be treated in the next section by the specification of a structural model.
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We present in Table 4 the results of probit estimations, in which the list of exogenous variables
includes the explanatory variables of preferences, fixed costs and wage rate. The heterogeneity
of the behaviour of the five sub-populations under study appears in these results.  
20
Everything else being constant, married women participate less in the different working activities
(against non-participation). However, when the age and education of the husband are included,
the coefficient of the dummy for married women becomes most of the time non-significant and
is only positively significant for the choice of working in the formal sector against non-
participation. Workers whose husbands are old have a lower probability of participating in the
formal sector against non-participation, which may be related to a traditional mentality of the head
according to which women should stay at home and not join the labour market. The husband’s
education is not significant.  The presence of children lowers labour participation in the formal
21
sector against unemployment, especially for children between 4 and 10 years old. This may be
related to the caring for children at home by mothers. The ‘inverse U curve’ describing the effects
of age is almost always significant, which corresponds to a usual feature of life cycle models.
The presence of substitutabilities in domestic work, between women and girls or young women
inside the household, is suggested by the positive effect of variables ‘number of female members
under 13 years old’ and ‘number of female members from 13 through 18 years old’, on
participation of women in the primary sector against non-participation and unemployment.Reasonable interpretation of the effects of the socio-economic variables in terms of entry costs has been
22
confirmed by D. Njinkeu, an economist from the University of Yaoundé.
We assume that the decisions are mainly taken by the female worker alone. A collective decision framework
23
for the household would have been more general, as in Chiappori (1988), but it would have entailed identification
difficulties, making impossible the estimation of the model.
12
The number of education years has positive effects on participation in the formal sector against
non-participation or unemployment, although it is associated with a lower probability of
participating in the second type of informal sector against unemployment. Dummies for primary
or higher education are less influential. Experience is positively associated with participation in
the formal or informal sectors against unemployment, and with participation in the informal sector
against non-participation. The effects of education and experience may be a mixture of their
influences on preferences and on wage rates or labour productivity, and are therefore difficult to
interpret. The predicted unearned income of the female worker is related to a lower probability
of participating in the second type of informal sector against non-participation, which may be
caused by an income effect on labour supply.
The effects of the other variables suggest that it would be possible to explain the fixed cost by
socio-economic characteristics related to the social connections of workers.  The probability of
22
entry into the primary sector against non-participation is higher (conditionally to other
independent variables) for women originated from another city than Yaoundé, and lower against
unemployment for women whose husband’s ethnic group is Ewondo or whose father worked in
services. The probability of entry into the secondary sector against unemployment is lower for
women whose husband’s ethnic group is Bassa, Bakoko or Bamiléké. The probability of
participation in the second type of informal sector against non-participation or unemployment is
lower for women originated from cities other than Yaoundé, and whose husbands’ ethnic group
is Bamiléké, although it is higher for women of the Bamiléké ethnic group.
4. The Model
We now present a model where we explicitly treat the selectivity caused by the choice between
the primary sector, the secondary sector and the non-working status. We simultaneously model
the activity choice, the entry cost into the primary sector and the labour supply, accounting for
hours rationing in the primary sector. The earnings function in the secondary sector is concave
with respect to working hours. The error terms in preferences, fixed costs and earnings functions
of the informal sector can be correlated because of unobserved heterogeneity and measurement
errors jointly influencing these three fundamental elements of the model. However, these
improvements of the modelling necessitate a drastic diminution of the number of exogenous
variables, and the number of sectors considered. We also consider that the wage rate in the
primary sector is exogenous because of institutional constraints and to simplify the estimation.
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In spite of all these simplifications our approach corrects for deficiencies of elementary models
that do not fully consider the fundamental problems of non-linearity, endogeneity and selectivity
involved in the estimation of a structural model.dR(h)
dh






4.1 Definition of regimes
The preferences of the individual over consumption C and worked hours (h) are represented either
with a direct utility function (U(c, h)), or with the corresponding indirect utility function (Q(w,
y)) where w is the wage rate and y is the appropriate measure of exogenous income. We assume
that the indirect utility function is strictly monotonically increasing in y and strictly monotonically
increasing and strictly quasi-convex in w. We denote h(w, y) for the Marshallian labour supply
function obtained from Q(w, y) through the Roy identity. The labour earnings function in the
secondary sector, R(h) is such that    , allowing for
decreasing return to labour. Only the labour of the individual enters in the subjacent production
function, which is consistent with the very imperfect labour market associated with informal
activities. We consider that the fixed cost (fc) of entry into the primary sector is given, while we
disregard the fixed cost of entry in the secondary sector. Any job in the primary sector is supposed
to be described by a fixed number of hours   accounting for the hours rationing in this sector, and
a given hourly wage rate w. As said above, simultaneous activities are excluded. If the labour
earnings function R(h) were linear in h, if there were no rationing in the primary sector, and if
there were no fixed costs, the comparisons in utility would be reduced to a comparison in wages.
In that case, the Roy model as described by Magnac (1991) would be the appropriate way to
model the sector choices. In our case, because of the existence of fixed costs, of hours rationing
and of the non-linearity of R(h), the sector choice is derived from the comparison of the sector-
dependent indirect utilities (as in Hausman (1985)). Thus, the activity and labour decisions of
workers have a similar structure to those of non-linear discrete continuous choice models
(Hanemann (1984)). 
The observed position is summarised in (s , h , R ), s  being the observed sector of activity
obs obs obs obs
(1, 2 or 3), h  being the observed labour supply, and R  being the observed non-wage activity
obs obs
income. (s , h , R ) is related to the latent model in the following way where the unobserved
obs obs obs
variables are replaced by a zero.
- (1, h ¯, 0) if (primary sector):
-
- a) U(c ¯, h ¯) $ Q(w (h ), µ (h ) + y )
v * v *
0
-
- b) U(c ¯, h ¯) $ U(y , 0), 0
-
(1) (s , h , R ) = - (2, h , R )        if (secondary sector):
obs obs obs * *
-
- a) Q(w (h ), µ (h ) + y ) $ U(c ¯, h ¯),
v * v *
0
-
- b) Q(w (h ), µ (h ) + y ) $ U(y , 0),
v * v *
0 0
-
- (3, 0, 0) if (non-participant):
-
- a) U(y , 0) > Q(w (h ), µ (h ) + y ), 0 0
v * v *
-w v(h) ’ dR(h)
dh
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- b) U(y , 0) > U(c ¯, h ¯), 0
where   are respectively the virtual wage and the
net virtual activity income associated with the implicit linear budget constraint in the secondary
sector.   is the consumption expenditure in the primary sector.
h  = h(w (h ), µ (h ) + y ) is the optimal labour supply in the secondary sector obtained from the
* v * v *
0
Roy identity, R  = R(h ) is the non-wage activity income in the secondary sector.
* *
We consider that the case of unemployed workers is exterior to this structural model. Indeed, the
comparison of their indirect utilities implies that, without job rationing, they would be included
among workers in the primary or secondary sectors. Then, the corresponding observations should
satisfy:
U(c ¯, h ¯) $ U(y , 0) or Q(w (h ), µ (h ) + y ) $ U(y , 0).  0 0 0
v * v *
However, to explain their unemployment status we would have to include in the model the entry
costs into the primary and secondary sectors, specific to these workers. Indeed, one may expect
that it is generally more difficult to find a job when coming from unemployment status, which may
be a signal of low productivity. Even when it is not the case, including this category of workers
in the model would complicate it too much, hampering an already complex estimation process.
We choose rather to consider the job-rationing process leading to unemployment as exogenous,
which is equivalent to excluding unemployed workers from the sample used in the estimation. 
4.2 The specification of the utility function
Several specifications of the utility function have been used in the labour supply literature. The
most common is certainly the linear form in income and wage (see Hausman (1981) and Stern
(1986)). Yet this form presents some deficiencies which makes it difficult to use in a structural
model: low-income individuals may exhibit a negative marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and hours of work, and for a sufficiently large wage rate, consumption becomes an
inferior good. As a simple alternative to Hausman’s form, we use of the following class of utility
functions that has recently been suggested by Blundell (1990).
(2)
where imposing $ > 0, 0 > ( > - 1 is sufficient to ensure the convexity of preferences, a strictly
positive marginal rate of substitution and the normality of consumption good. Using Roy identity
we obtain the following labour supply function:
(3) .
Heterogeneity of preferences can be introduced through the intercept term ". When the labour
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For instance while the Cobb-Douglas specification meets the first requirement easily, it never meets the second
24
one since marginal return to labour tends to infinity when hours tend to zero. 
15
associated with the separating hyperplane of the optimisation programme, can be defined as the
roots of the system of equations:
(4) ,
(5) c = T(c, h) h + µ(c, h).
The direct utility function can then be obtained by
(6) U(c, h) = Q(T(c, h), µ(c, h)),
which yields the following marginal utilities:
(7) ,   and   
which have the appropriate signs if and only if T(c, h) is strictly positive.
4.3 Specification of the earnings function in the informal sector
The choice of a functional form is driven by crucial arguments. Firstly, we must be able to obtain
decreasing returns to labour over a sufficiently wide range of hours in order to obtain a unique
equilibrium in the secondary sector. Secondly, to allow for non-participation, the marginal return
to labour at zero hours must be bounded.  The specification of the earnings function that we use
24
here has been introduced by Rosen (1976). It is such that:
(8) R(h) = h exp(> + * h),
where > and * are parameters. Constant returns are obtained when * = 0, and provided we are
willing to bound the time endowment of any individual by T, positive marginal returns to labour
and decreasing returns to labour are obtained if  . The logarithm of the average
income relates to the log-average-wage equation for which we have:
(9) .
The implicit wage rate in the secondary sector is:
(10) R’(h) = (1 + * h).R(h)/h .µv (h) ’ R(h) & h R )(h) ’ & * h R(h)




Adding exogenous explanatory variables and an error term to > is a simple way to introduce
deterministic and stochastic variation into this equation.  Since the marginal return to labour at
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zero hours is bounded, this specification allows for non-participants. Finally the virtual net activity
income is obtained by subtracting the implicit value of labour input.
(11)
5. Estimation of the Structural Model
5.1 Some econometric difficulties
Several econometric difficulties have to be coped with. They guide the functional and stochastic
specification of the model:
C the selectivity bias has been well documented in the literature for the standard labour
supply model (see Heckman and MaCurdy (1986)). Chiswick (1988) proposes to
incorporate in an analysis of earnings those labour force participants who are self-
employed, and thus avoids the bias in the earnings functions coefficients that arises when
the sample is restricted to wage earners. We go a step further by explicitly including in the
global model the endogenous selectivity rules and a non-linear earnings function for the
secondary sector. We treat the selectivity bias by estimating an integrated model, in which
all sector choices are simultaneously estimated;
C identification conditions have to be imposed in switching response models. For instance,
in the case of probit model, the coefficients of explanatory variables are only identified up
to a multiplicative constant. Such identification problems are much less likely to occur
when a non-linear earnings function is used, since some collinearity problems disappear.
However, because of the highly non-linear character of our model, it is not possible to
globally identify a large set of parameters with accuracy. This explains why the number
of exogenous variables is quite limited in this model. Moreover, the correct derivation of
the likelihood from the error terms distribution implies to impose the logical coherency
property to the model (see Gouriéroux, Laffont, Monfort (1980)). This is satisfied by
insisting that parameter values must lead to a unique optimum for each value of the error
terms and vice versa. This condition is obtained firstly by assuming strict concavity of the
utility function and the earnings function, and by the fact that the event defined by the
equality of utility levels in two different sectors has a null probability.
5.2 The likelihood function and the exogenous variables
The full model is given by system (1) with the functional form (2) for the utility function and the
equation (8) as the earnings function in the secondary sector. The maximum likelihood method
used in the estimations is fully discussed in Appendix 1. The stochastic specification involves three
terms related to the following structural parameters of the model: the heterogeneity of
preferences, ", the scale of the revenue function, >, and the fixed cost, fc. ", > and fc are supposed
to be linear in the error terms and some characteristics of the individual, and are assumed to be
distributed according to a trivariate normal distribution. The measurement unit of the fixed cost is Franc CFA. Its variance may also be considered as a measure of
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heterogeneity of the budget constraint specific to the primary sector. Finally, a dual interpretation of the fixed cost
suggests that it partially accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity in the rationing of hours (around 40 per week) in the
primary sector. 
  Initially, the entry costs were explained by the ethnic group of the female worker or of her husband. Indeed,
the social obstacles or privileges involved in entry into activity sectors are likely to depend on the characteristics of the
parents or of the family, as much as on the personal characteristics of the female worker. The other explanatory variables
of the entry costs are the geographical origin (Yaoundé, other cities than Yaoundé, countryside), the social origin
(activity sector of the father or of the husband’s father), and the preceding firm (administration, large private firm, small
private firm...). However, since the choice of the preceding firm is likely to be endogenous, we have instrumented these
variables in the estimation. Unfortunately, if the model with explanatory variables of fixed costs converges, the
variance–covariance matrix of its parameters is not estimable because of poor identification.
Because of all the non-linearities involved in the model, the computation is time-consuming. The precision
27
required for the integration and for the root finding makes it variable. One week of calculation time with GAUSS on a
SUN-SPARC station is a typical duration for one estimation. The starting values are obtained after the estimation of the
model on a 30 per cent random sample of the final dataset. Several 30 per cent sub-samples have been tried and the
values obtained were similar to one another. The region of convergence had also to be reached by grid method and
likelihood concentration methods so as to compensate the inaccuracy of the gradient method near the optimum. Note
also that the algorithm for a similar model with hours freely chosen in the primary sector does not converge. See the
appendix 1 for more details about the optimisation of the likelihood.
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Because of the high non-linearity of the model, it is not possible to identify with accuracy all the
parameters related to the explanatory variables when they are included at the same time in
preferences, technology and entry cost. Therefore, we decided to introduce each explanatory
variable in only one of these structures (preferences, technology, entry cost) and where it seems
to be the more relevant.
Earnings (or wage rate) are explained by the usual variables coming from human capital theory
(age and age squared, education level, experience), but also, in the case of the informal sector,
by the characteristics of the individual firm (here the value of the capital stock of the firm,
approximated by the assets of the household). We have special interests in the role of children that
provide incentives to the mother to take care of them, and on the other hand in the role of other
female members who could substitute themselves to the female workers in the domestic activities.
The complex sociological phenomena occurring in the households for these considerations lead
us to assume that the preferences of the female worker depend on the number of children and the
number of female members, both categories split up into two age classes. The preferences depend
also on the age of the woman and a dummy variable for married women, since age is a major
determinant of preferences and the presence of a husband is expected to have a strong influence
on female worker decisions. 
Because of identification difficulties, it has not been possible to include the explanatory variables
of entry costs in the estimation of the complete model, as they have been included in the
dichotomic participation models in section 3.3.
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5.3 Estimation results
Table 5 provides one typical estimation of the model.  The parameters $ and (1/(), which are
27
related to the economic variables, i.e. predicted wage and predicted unearned income, are well
determined. It has been suggested that the latter effect may be related to the bad economic conjuncture, since married
28
women may be losing advantages linked to the husband’s job, while non-married workers are not subject to this shock.
Note that to the best of our knowledge, nobody has yet succeeded in estimating fixed-cost functions in such
29
non-linear models. This may explain why Newman and Gertler (1994) choose to eliminate the budget constraint in their
model and rely on comparisons of implicit log-wages based on linear specifications. One reason of this difficulty is that
only very rich datasets can identify with accuracy the parameters both in the linear budget constraint and in a non-linear
production function included in this budget constraint. Indeed, the corresponding Fisher information matrix shows
columns that are likely to be very correlated, leading to its quasi-singularity and the impossibility of estimating the
variance–covariance matrix of parameters. 




The number of young children under 4 years of age has a negative effect on the propensity to
work, which may reflect their need for caring from the female worker. By contrast, the number
of children between 4 and 10 of age, the number of female members and the fact that the
individual is married,  provide incentives to work. The presence of other female members may
28
ease the substitutability of the female worker’s labour in domestic activities. Age has no
significant effect on work decisions. This may be due to compensation effects in the life cycle.
Including both age and age squared has not been possible since these variables are too much
correlated to be accurately identified in this model.
Fixed costs are identified by the structure that we impose on preference and technology. Because
of the highly non-linear character of the model, we have not been able to obtain estimates for the
variance–covariance matrix of the parameters when explanatory variables have been included in
the fixed costs, even when the convergence is reached.  The constant fixed-cost coefficient is not
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significant. However, its estimate is 4.4 per cent of the non-labour exogenous income for primary
sector workers, although respectively 11.2 per cent and 10.9 per cent for workers in secondary
sectors of types a and b, and respectively 6.6 per cent and 8.3 per cent for non-participants and
unemployed workers. This is consistent with the fact that the entry cost contributes to the
selection of workers since it corresponds to a relatively lower financial burden for actually
observed primary workers. It is remarkable that workers for whom the fixed cost is a relatively
larger financial constraint, compared to their financial capacity without wage income, and that
may not access to the primary sector, seem rather to be rejected in the secondary sector than in
inactivity. The variance F  is large and indicates that the amount of fixed costs any individual face fc
can be very variable. 
The estimates of coefficients of the earnings function are the most interesting. The household
assets, which are a proxy for the capital stock of the firm, are statistically significant, which
reveals the inadequacy of the standard wage rate approach in this context. The experience and the
education of the female worker positively influence the productivity, which was not the case in
the wage rate equation of the primary sector.  The parameter * is significantly negative, which
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implies that the earnings function is strictly concave and confirms the relevance of our
simultaneous non-linear modelling approach. Then, the estimation of the structural model,
consistent with the theoretical framework, provides evidence for the non-linearity of the
technology of the informal sector. However, the estimated curvature of the earnings function is
very moderate. This may be caused by two features of the studied context. First, as ourLinear reduced-form models are still valid competitors of the structural approach, since they permit the
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introduction of a large number of explanatory variables even if the interpretation of their results is difficult. The
impossibility of including all explanatory variables in our framework is the reason why we do not attempt to compare
our results with a linear reduced approach. We prefer to focus on the structural properties of our model rather than on
the robustness of the effects.
However, it must be recalled that this approach, because of identification difficulties, may hide effects of some
32
explanatory variables of the entry cost. 
Observed elasticity should account for the non-separability of the system and changes of regime.
33
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preliminary statistical analysis shows, the informal sector is an aggregate of heterogeneous
activities, with some workers receiving very variable remunerations and others paid at almost a
fixed wage rate. The contribution of these last workers in the likelihood pushes the estimates
towards a null curvature. Second, as in organisational dualism theories, the earnings of the female
worker may be shared with other members of the family, and average implicit wage or a fraction
of the implicit wage may sometimes be closer to the characteristics of the decision process, than
the actual implicit wage. Nonetheless, the linear implicit log-wage equations, which are used in
the literature and in section 3, are likely to be a source of misspecification.
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Finally, the correlation coefficients between preferences, fixed cost and technology are all
significant, which supports the joint modelling of these structures as a response to the existence
of unobserved heterogeneity influencing at the same time preferences, technology and entry
costs.
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Table 6 provides several useful statistics based on the separation structure of the optimisation
programme, for the mean households, in seven sub-populations of interest. They are estimates of
elasticities of labour supply and demand; elasticities of earnings; wages and incomes. They
characterise potential labour responses, incomes and wages, for mean worker in each sector,
under the assumption that there is no change of regime, and in reference to a simplified set of
constraints (the implicit separating hyperplane associated with the optimisation programme). It
must be remembered that those statistics are related to latent variables, and do not generally
correspond to observed elasticities.  They provide, however, useful analytical information about
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the properties of the estimated system. We distinguish the statistics associated with latent
consumer and latent producer programs. We calculate these statistics, using as the value of h, the
average observed labour supply and the mean characteristics in every sub-population. For the non-
participants and the unemployed, we account for the fact that their reservation rate should be
higher than the implicit proposed wage rates (in absence of fixed costs and hours rationing), by
using the maximum of the predicted wage rates of the primary and the secondary sectors wage
rates (in practice the primary sector wage rate).
a. Latent consumer program:
Definitions
e  = $/h - (( y )/(w h) is the elasticity of the latent labour supply with respect to the observed 1 0 
wage rate.
e  = Xb / h is the elasticity of the latent labour supply with respect to the characteristic X of 2,i i i i
the preferences. Equal to the labour supply in the global model at the equilibrium.
34
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e = " / h denotes the sum of these elasticities for all characteristics of the preferences (including 2 
the constant term).
e  = (( y )/(w h) is the elasticity of the latent labour supply with respect to the exogenous 3 0 
income. 
b. Latent producer program:
The earnings function in the formal sector is bilinear in actual wage and hours, and does not
present any difficulty. We consider the earnings function in the informal sector as a latent earnings
function, under the assumption that there is no change of regime.
Definitions
e  = 1+*h is the latent earnings (from the informal production) elasticity with respect to the 4
worked hours. 
e = Zc is the latent earnings (from the informal production) elasticity with respect to the 5,j  j j
characteristic Z of the technology. j
e  = > denotes the sum of these latent earnings elasticities, for all the characteristics of the 5
technology (including the constant term).
Other useful statistics can be derived from the profit maximisation programme of the latent
producer, where the restricted profit function is A(h) = R(h) - w h. Since the earnings function
is strictly concave, the optimal labour demand  is given by the first-order condition:
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RN(h) = w, i.e. (1 + * h) exp(> + * h) = w.
The differentiation of this equation yields the following elasticities of the labour demand for the
latent producer sub-program.
Definitions
e  = w / [ h * (2 + * h) exp(> + * h) ] is the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the 6a
observed wage rate w. 
e  = ( 1 + * h) / [ h * (2 + * h)] is the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the shadow 6b
wage rate in the informal sector.
e  = - Z c  (1 + * h) / [ h * (2 + * h) ] is the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the 7,k k k
characteristic Z  of the technology. k
e7 = -(1 + * h) / [ h * (2 + * h) ] is the sum of these elasticities of labour demand, for all the
characteristics of the technology.
c. Implicit wages and incomes
Definitions
w  is the predicted wage rate in the formal sector. w  is the predicted wage rate in the informal 1 2
sector. w  is value of the marginal productivity in the informal sector, which can be 3
considered as the shadow wage rate in the labour-autarkic informal sector. To shorten the exposition, we show in table 6 only aggregate elasticities e , e  and e , which we do not
35
2 5 7
comment, instead of elasticities with respect to elementary characteristics of preferences or technology, as would be
possible. The latter can be easily calculated from the provided descriptive statistics.
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R  is the exogenous income. R  is the exogenous income minus the entry cost in the primary 0 1
sector. R  is the earnings level given by the earnings function in the informal sector, for 3
the observed worked hours.
d. Results:
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The wage elasticities (e ) of the labour supply in the primary sector (0.371), or in the secondary 1
sector (0.493 and 0.485) compare well with traditional figures (Killingsworth (1983), Blundell
(1992)). They correspond to virtual situations where only the implicit budget constraint (therefore
without fixed costs or hours rationing) is considered. Since ( < 0, e  is higher for high exogenous 1
incomes and lower for high labour supply levels, other variables being maintained constant. e  is 1
higher in the secondary sector because the wage rate is much lower, which is far from fully
compensated by a lower exogenous income and larger worked hours.
The elasticity of the labour supply with respect to the exogenous income, (e ), is lower in absolute 3
value in the primary sector (-0.186) than in the secondary sector (-0.308, -0.299). This is due, as
before, to a higher wage rate in the primary sector. Naturally, for the non-participants and the
unemployed, the wage elasticity tends to plus infinity and the exogenous income elasticity tends
to minus infinity, when the worked hours tends to zero. 
The elasticity of earnings with respect to worked hours, e , is almost similar for the mean 4
household in any sector, and close to 1. This result comes from the very moderate concavity of
the earnings function. The elasticity of the latent labour demand, with respect to the implicit wage
rate, e  (calculated from the estimated marginal productivity at mean hours), is always strongly 6b
negative, and close for the two activity sectors, since the mean levels of worked hours are similar
in both sectors. The elasticity of the latent labour demand with respect to the observed wage, is
still stronger in absolute value, and lower in absolute value for the workers observed in the
informal sector (-9.7 and -10.7), than for the workers observed in the formal sector (-19.9). This
suggests, that the adjustment of labour allocation in the informal sector may be substantially more
flexible with the introduction of perfect markets in each sector, assuming that these markets clear
at the respective observed mean values of wages.
The implicit marginal wage rate in the informal sector, w , is always lower than the mean 3
predicted wage rates in both sectors. It is much higher (more than twice) for workers observed
in the formal sector, than for workers observed in the informal sector, due to the higher education,
experience and assets of the former.
Finally, the potential activity income coming from the informal activities of the female workers,
(R ), is on average relatively small compared to the exogenous income (R ), even when 2 0
subtracting the entry cost into the formal sector (fc). Indeed, beyond the non-activity incomes of
the households, the labour incomes of the other members of the family, and particularly of the
husband, constitute most of the family income. This suggests that a further analysis of female
activity decisions could benefit from the consideration of activity decisions of other members.22
6. Conclusion
In the dualist context of developing countries, labour supply and activity choices are likely to be
distorted by the existence of labour market imperfections. Modelling and testing these phenomena
raises complex econometric issues, specially when one allows for the presence of a non-linear
earnings function in the informal sector, allied to quasi-autarky of labour in this sector, and entry
costs and hours rationing in the formal sector. This explains why no models dealing jointly with
these characteristics have been estimated until now. This paper is a first step toward such a task.
We consider a cross-section sample of female workers from Yaoundé (Cameroon) allocated to
three different sectors. The first sector is that of modern salaried activities where the wages are
high, but for which fixed costs and labour time rationing exist. The second sector is that of
informal self-employed activities, for which there exist diminishing returns to labour. The third
sector is non-participation. The analysis of the data shows features specific to dualistic labour
markets.
We estimate a joint model of the activity choice and the labour supply, where the error terms in
the preferences, the fixed cost and the return to labour in informal technology may be correlated.
In spite of technical difficulties, this approach is proven tractable and our results provide evidence
for the concavity of the earnings function in the informal sector with respect to the hours. We
identify the explanatory variables of the preferences and the earnings function in this simultaneous
structural estimation, and derive elasticities for different sectors.
Since there is no perfectly substitutable worker in the labour market for the female worker in the
informal sector (notably because of supervision costs), the concavity of the earnings function
implies that the consumption–leisure, the choice of activity sector and the production–labour
decisions are not separable. This element, joined to hours rationing and entry costs in the formal
sector, means that the second welfare theorem does not readily apply and it is not possible easily
to decentralise a welfare objective through the use of a general wage policy only. Policies specific
to each sector based on their observable characteristics and not only on prices or wages may then
be an alternative to consider.23
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics by sector of activity, for female workers
Primary Secondary Secondary Secondary Non- Unemployed Inactivity Whole
sector sector (a) sector (b) sector participant sector population
(complete) (complete)
Age 36.37 35.57 34.75 35.16 32.01 28.77 29.58 32.43
(6.8) (8.3) (7.9) (8.07) (9.2) (6.7) (7.54) (8.1)
Years of experience 11.45 8.50 8.32 8.40 1.73 1.33 1.43 5.41
(6.65) (8.11) (7.89) (7.98) (4.56) (4.01) (4.16) (7.29)
Years of education 11.92 6.61 6.36 6.48 7.83 8.78 8.54 9.07
(4.0) (3.6) (4.0) (3.78) (4.6) (3.3) (3.70) (4.2)
Husband’s age 27.7 28.03 28.68 28.36 37.02 31.64 32.99 30.71
(20.4) (20.6) (21.6) (21.04) (13.4) (14.4) (14.38) (17.66)
Husband’s years of 9.60 5.79 5.90 5.85 9.52 9.12 9.22 8.70
education (7.9) (5.6) (5.58) (5.59) (5.70) (5.4) (5.45) (6.4)
Primary education 0.11 0.59 0.65 0.62 0.46 0.34 0.37 0.35
(0.32) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48)
Higher education 0.28 0.009 0.044 0.027 0.10 0.072 0.079 0.12
(0.45) (0.09) (0.21) (0.16) (0.30) (0.26) (0.27) (0.33)
Number of female 0.67 0.45 0.54 0.50 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.47
members between (0.86) (0.72) (0.71) (0.73) (0.66) (0.70) (0.69) (0.75)
13 and 18 years
Number of female 1.15 1.27 1.14 1.20 1.03 1.18 1.14 1.15
members between 0 (1.28) (1.22) (1.28) (1.25) (1.24) (1.23) (1.24) (1.25)
and 12 years
Number of children 0.47 0.51 0.54 0.53 0.74 0.71 0.72 0.62
under 4 years (0.73) (0.71) (0.71) (0.71) (0.84) (0.75) (0.77) (0.75)
Number of children 1.16 1.26 1.23 1.24 1.02 1.24 1.18 1.19
between 4 and 10 (1.19) (1.31) (1.15) (1.23) (1.18) (1.32) (1.29) (1.25)
years
Number of depend- 1.85 1.41 1.54 2.76 1.04 1.36 1.28 1.47
ent members (2.37) (2.93) (2.04) (2.16) (1.68) (1.80) (1.77) (2.11)
Dummy for married 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.93 0.86 0.88 0.79
woman (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.25) (0.34) (0.32) (0.41)
Origin from other 0.62 0.56 0.44 0.50 0.61 0.63 0.62 0.60
cities than Yaoundé (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49)
Preceding job in 0.25 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.18
administration (0.43) (0.30) (0.32) (0.31) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38)
Sector of husband’s 0.20 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.35 0.33 0.29
father = agriculture (0.40) (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) (0.48) (0.47) (0.45)
Sector of father = 0.24 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31
agriculture (0.43) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46)
Sector of father = 0.36 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.25 0.29 0.28 0.29
services (0.48) (0.41) (0.38) (0.40) (0.43) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45)
Husband’s ethny = 0.08 0.018 0.044 0.031 0.060 0.086 0.079 0.071
Bassa and Bakoko (0.27) (0.13) (0.21) (0.17) (0.24) (0.28) (0.27) (0.26)
Husband’s ethny = 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.25
Bamiléké (0.36) (0.40) (0.41) (0.40) (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.44)
Husband’s ethny = 0.10 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.15
Ewondo (0.30) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39) (0.34) (0.38) (0.37) (0.36)
Ethny = Bamiléké 0.20 0.28 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.36 0.34 0.30
(0.40) (0.45) (0.48) (0.46) (0.46) (0.48) (0.48) (0.46)
Weeks per year 45.23 41.03 41.71 41.37 4.57 2.71 3.17 21.52
(8.30) (13.63) (14.46) (14.02) (13.96) (9.69) (10.94) (22.98)
Hours per week 38.94 42.64 41.88 42.25 0 9.73 9.73 39.69
(8.47) (23.21) (20.39) (21.78) (0) (10.48) (10.48) (15.88)
Assets (*) 878.50 1188.76 795.64 989.58 301.40 171.96 204.42 530.22
(2720) (5209) (2080) (3943) (2079) (1006) (1356.39) (2443)
Unearned income 61.02 24.07 24.60 24.34 40.74 32.49 34.56 39.81
(predicted) (*) (64.9) (24.6) (29.2) (27.01) (43.37) (26.21) (31.57) (44.64)
Secondary sector 0.49 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.20 0.28
wage (predicted) (*) (0.47) (0.13) (0.19) (0.16) (0.23) (0.17) (0.19) (0.31)
Primary sector wage 0.79 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.46
(predicted) (*) (0.54) (0.23) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.20) (0.22) (0.40)
Observed wage (*) 67.02 33.40 – – – – – 45.77
(112.07) (68.44) (94.72)
Number of  330 111 114 225 168 502 670 1225
observations
* : in thousands of FCFA.26
Table 2: Log-wage equations
Primary sector Secondary sector
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Constant -1.914 -1.468 -3.355 -5.731
(5.3) (0.05) (5.9) (2.3)
Age -0.0020 -0.057 0.0228 0.0229
(0.3) (1.15) (1.7) (0.8)
Years of education 0.0707 0.140 0.0483 0.268
(3.60) (0.6) (1.3) (1.1)
Experience 0.0398 0.113 0.0119 0.049
(3.78) (1.7) (1.0) (0.7)
Primary education -0.206 -0.295 0.0123 1.127
(1.2) (0.2) (0.05) (0.8)
Higher education 0.653 0.101 1.362 -0.161
(4.4) (0.06) (2.6) (0.08)
R 0.536 – 0.205 –
2
Number of observations 188 188 108 108
Wages are measured in thousands of FCFA per week. Hausman Test statistic for the endogeneity of
experience and education: 6.791 for primary sector, 1.088 for secondary sector, 15.378 for the whole set of
participants. The instruments are the number of children, the number of children aged from 0 to 3, from 4 to
10, from 11 to 15, the education level of the parents, the occupation of the father, the age and education of
the husband.27
Table 3: Non-labour income equations
Heckman two-steps  Ordinary Least
estimates Squares
Variables Estimate (t-value) Estimate (t-value)
Constant 2.582 (2.0) 1.067 (3.3)
Number of children 0.071 (1.6) 0.099 (3.2)
Number of children from 0 to 3 years old -0.194 (2.5) -0.146 (2.7)
Number of children from 4 to 10 years old -0.0928 (1.7) -0.086 (1.9)
Number of dependants 0.008 (0.4) 0.027 (1.7)
Husband’s age 0.0256 (2.3) 0.016 (2.4)
Husband’s years of education 0.0857 (3.7) 0.096 (5.6)
Husband’s primary education -0.115 (0.7) -0.145 (1.1)
Husband’s higher education 0.146 (0.77) 0.233 (1.7)
Husband’s father employed -0.406 (1.6) -0.259 (1.4)
Husband’s father self-employed 0.128 (1.2) 0.157 (1.9)
Husband’s father employed in public sector 0.252 (1.1) 0.052 (0.4)
Husband’s father employed in small private firm -0.731 (2.0) -0.673 (2.4)
Husband’s father employed in large private firm 0.347 (2.0) 0.322 (2.3)
Age -0.0007 (0.08) 0.003 (0.5)
Years of education 0.035 (1.5) 0.021 (1.2)
Primary education 0.032 (0.2) -0.046 (-0.4)
Higher education 0.208 (1.1) 0.227 (1.5)
Father employed 0.0209 (0.11) 0.132 (1.0)
Father self-employed -0.0424 (0.4) -0.047 (0.6)
Father employed in public sector -0.137 (0.9) -0.165 (1.3)
Father employed in small private firm -0.181 (0.5) 0.035 (0.1)
Father employed in large private firm 0.0470 (0.3) 0.0041 (0.03)
Dummy for married woman -1.534 (1.4) -0.281 (0.8)
Mill’s ratio -1.492 (1.2) – –
R 0.421 0.420
2
Number of observations 956 95628
Table 4: Estimates of dichotomic choices (Probit Maximum Likelihood) 
Choices
1/4 1/5 2/4 2/5 3/4 3/5 Whole
sample Explanatory variables
Constant -8.3167 -8.5467 -4.0872 -3.7725 -4.2819 -4.5316 -6.1652
(-4.40) (-6.40) (-2.38) (-2.89) (-2.42) (-3.45) (-7.17)
Married woman 1.8990 0.4296 -0.5870 -0.0558 -1.3175 -0.8350 0.1599
(2.13) (0.77) (-0.68) (-0.09) (-1.42) (-1.30) (0.40)
Age 0.4561 0.3867 0.2756 0.1773 0.3141 0.2508 0.3181
(4.40) (5.09) (2.86) (2.38) (3.19) (3.29) (6.47)
Age squared -0.0068 -0.0053 -0.0041 -0.0023 -0.0047 -0.0035 -0.0044
(-4.62) (-4.86) (-3.11) (-2.22) (-3.49) (-3.24) (-6.32)
Number of children
between 0 and 3 years
-0.1033 -0.0444 -0.0930 0.0045 -0.0620 0.0396 -0.0397
(-0.77) (-0.46) (-0.69) (0.04) (-0.45) (0.37) (-0.59)
Number of children
between 4 and 10 years
-0.0802 -0.1479 0.0946 -0.0532 0.0387 -0.1108 -0.0667
(-0.81) (-2.32) (0.96) (-0.74) (0.37) (-1.46) (1.43)
Number of female members
under 13 years
0.0277 0.1202 -0.0459 0.0417 -0.1144 -0.0305 0.0410
(0.31) (1.85) (-0.45) (0.55) (-1.14) (-0.40) (0.87)
Number of female members
between 13 and 18 years
0.2583 0.1633 0.0594 -0.0172 0.0424 0.0324 0.0617
(1.81) (1.88) (0.40) (-0.17) (0.27) (0.32) (0.96)
Husband’s age -0.0675 -0.0144 -0.0089 0.0054 0.0057 0.0156 -0.0082
(-3.67) (-1.21) (-0.53) (0.44) (0.34) (1.24) (-1.02)
Husband’s education -0.0063 0.0068 0.0039 -0.0293 0.0386 0.0266 0.0005
(-0.24) (0.34) (0.14) (-1.26) (1.22) (1.05) (0.04)
Education 0.0976 0.1035 -0.0094 -0.0473 -0.0372 -0.0802 0.0156
(2.46) (3.39) (-0.21) (-1.30) (-0.78) (-2.21) (0.73)
Dummy for primary
education
-0.4671 0.0807 0.0863 0.1504 0.1495 0.2519 0.1524
(-1.56) (0.38) (0.30) (0.71) (0.51) (1.18) (1.06)
Dummy for higher
education
0.0749 0.0432 -1.1542 -0.4335 0.0732 0.3944 0.2573
(0.23) (0.18) (-1.57) (-0.96) (0.15) (1.15) (1.38)
Unearned income -0.0001 0.0016 -0.0045 0.0035 -0.0103 -0.0006 -0.0002
(-0.14) (0.75) (-1.50) (1.19) (-2.98) (-0.20) (-0.33)
Origin from another city
than Yaoundé
0.3238 -0.0159 0.0597 0.0064 -0.6142 -0.3688 -0.0720
(1.69) (-0.12) (0.30) (0.05) (-2.97) (-2.46) (-0.79)
Bamiléké woman 0.3783 -0.0804 0.9815 0.3588 1.4366 0.9686 0.3600
(0.63) (-0.27) (1.07) (1.10) (2.13) (3.20) (1.62)
Husband’s ethny = Bassa or
Bakoko
0.1799 -0.2676 -0.1850 -0.9036 0.3673 -0.3195 -0.2482
(0.46) (-1.12) (-0.32) (-2.14) (0.83) (-1.04) (-1.32)
Husband’s ethny =
Bamiléké
-0.7652 -0.2665 -1.0466 -0.6005 -1.1511 -0.9925 -0.5144
(-1.23) (-0.81) (-1.09) (-1.65) (-1.62) (-2.88) (-2.10)
Husband’s ethny = Ewondo -0.2204 -0.3850 0.0935 -0.2239 -0.2755 -0.3664 -0.2928
(-0.77) (-1.90) (0.33) (-1.07) (-0.85) (-1.61) (-2.08)
Sector of father =
agriculture
-0.0315 -0.0231 -0.1828 -0.0638 -0.0295 0.0249 0.0242
(-0.13) (-0.14) (-0.74) (-0.36) (-0.12) (0.14) (0.21)
Sector of father = services -0.0217 -0.3022 0.3837 0.1193 0.0836 -0.2853 -0.0650
(-0.09) (-1.90) (1.48) (0.65) (0.30) (-1.49) (-0.56)
Sector of husband’s father
= agriculture
0.2710 -0.1310 0.2651 -0.0239 0.2788 -0.0625 0.0071
(1.25) (-0.88) (1.27) (-0.15) (1.29) (-0.38) (0.07)
Preceding job in
administration
-0.4960 0.5190 -1.0721 -0.0861 -0.4356 0.6671 0.2214
(-0.97) (1.43) (-1.42) (-0.17) (-0.62) (1.35) (0.78)
Experience 0.2162 0.1479 0.1154 0.0887 0.1176 0.093 0.1365
(0.02) (12.4) (6.10) (7.22) (6.08) (7.72) (15.6)
t-values are given in parenthesis29
Table 5: Maximum likelihood estimates




Number of children between 0 and 3 years -5.52
(2.9)




Number of female members over 13 years 4.65
(2.4)





















F F" " 32.8
(17.2)






D D"> "> -0.44
(5.4)
D D" ",fc 0.23
(2.9)
D D> >,fc -0.66
(2.6)
A few aberrant observations (19) have been discarded from the sample so as to reach the convergence point.
To ease the optimisation algorithm behaviour, some variables have been rescaled: hours are per week, wages
in thousands of FCFA, assets in millions of FCFA, education and age in dizains of years. This must be taken
into account when interpreting the above parameters.30
Table 6: Elasticities, wages and incomes for different sectors
Statistics of type a of type b (com- partici- loyed (com- sample
formal informal informal informal non- unemp- inactivity whole
plete) pants plete)
e labour supply 0.37 0.493 0.485 0.497 +4 +4 +4 0.46 1 
w.r.t. wage rate
e labour supply 1.9 1.911 1.904 1.907 +4 +4 +4 1.98 2 
w.r.t. char.
preferences
e labour supply -0.2  -0.31 -0.3 -0.31 -4 -4 -4 -0.27 3 
w.r.t. non-labour
income
e earnings w.r.t. 0.93 0.926  0.926 0.926 1 1 0.999 0.93 4 
worked hours
e earnings w.r.t. -1.2 -1.91 -1.96 -1.94 -2.153 -2.021 -2.04 -1.79 5 
char. technology








e  labour demand -7.8 -12.4 -12.8 -12.6 -4 -4 -4 -12.1 7
w.r.t. char
technology
w  wage rate in 0.79 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.46 1
primary sector
w  wage rate in 0.49 0.19 0.2 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.2 0.28 2
secondary sector
w  implicit wage 0.26 0.127 0.121 0.124 0.116 0.133 0.13 0.143 3
rate in secondary
sector
R  non-labour 61 24.07 24.6 24.34 40.74 32.49 34.56 39.81 0
income inactive
R  non-labour 58.3 21.38 21.91 21.65 38.05 29.8 31.87 37.12 1
income minus
entry cost
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1 (", fc) - ¯ >
Given a value of ", the second inequality gives us an upper bound for the fixed cost, i.e. fc  ("). This quantity
36 M
1
does not depend on the scale of production. Provided the Slutsky condition is satisfied this bound is unique. Therefore,
for any value of the fixed cost less than the upper bound fc  (") and any value of ", the upper bound for the production 1
M
scale can be defined, i.e. >  (", fc). Note that in the optimisation programme, the upper and lower bounds in the 1
M




The next sections describe the contributions to the likelihood of each regime.
(12)
Primary sector workers
This regime is such that the following inequalities are fulfilled:
(13) ,




where we have extended our notation to take into account the dependence on the error terms in
", > and fc and where w  and µ  are short notations for T(.,.) and µ(.,.) defined in (4) and (5).
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M is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and N [., ., D] is the bivariate standard 2
normal probability density function. The matrices ’ , ’ , ’  are relevant sub-matrices of ’ 11 12 21
following results on the conditional distribution of multivariate normal random variables (see
Monfort (1983)).
Self-employed workers
If for the secondary sector workers we assume that the earnings function depends non-linearly on
the labour supplied, which is endogenous to our model, the selectivity issue cannot be ignored.
The description of the probability for this regime follows a very similar route. The following
equations characterise a self-employed worker:Q(w
v(h
( (", >); >), µ
v(h
( (", >); > + y0; ") $ U(¯ c (fc), ¯ h; ")
h ( (", >) = h(w v(h ( (",>); >), µv(h ( (", >); >); ")
R
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e
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U(y0, 0; ") > U(¯ c (fc), ¯ h; ")





Given the values of " and > which solve the last two equations, the inequality enables us to define




where  ,  ,  , and where J is the determinant of the
Jacobian matrix of the transformation of the error terms " and > into the observed values h  and
*
R . While the sub-matrices ’  (i = 1; j = 1, 2) are different from their counterparts of the previous
*
ij
section they are defined with the same convention where i correspond to the lines number of the
block and j to its column number.
(17) ,
with
The likelihood of the self-employed workers can be changed slightly to account for the fact that
the revenue lies inside a given range. Since the scale of the revenue function lies in a range




where J  results from the changing in variables from " to h . 2b
*
Non-participants
The regime is described by the following inequalities:
(19)
.
Given ", it is possible to define a lower bound for the fixed costs, fc  ("), and an upper bound 3
m
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where  and with obvious notations.
Our model can account for the unemployed workers, that is, individuals who are willing to work
but are rationed at zero hours, provided that the rationing mechanism does not depend on the
determinant of the choice. In that case, the probability to be observed as a participant in the
primary sector is the product of the probability of being unconstrained at zero hours and L . The 1
probability to be observed as a participant in the secondary sector is the product of the probability
of being unconstrained at zero hours and L . The probability to be unemployed is the product of 2
the probability of being constrained at zero hours and (1 - L ). Finally, the resulting likelihood 3
contribution must be divided by the probability of being unconstrained so as to account for the
truncature of the sample caused by the elimination of unemployed workers. Under the assumption
of exogeneity of the rationing process, maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters of the
model outlined above, and thus, based on the marginal likelihood only, yields consistent and
efficient estimates. Different probabilities of being rationed can also be adopted for unemployed
workers in formal and informal sectors, provided that these probabilities are exogeneous with
respect to our structural model.34